THEATRUM BELLI

At present the British government's position is that since 2001 the British have been threatened by a series of massive bomb attacks ; fifteen plots have been interdicted at an advanced state of readiness, ninety plotters have been arrested and convicted and a further forty have been convicted on lesser charges of implication. The only attack to succeed killed fifty seven civilians and injured a further seven hundred in the close confines of the London transport system . The British Government argue that the reasons why the fifteen detected attacks were not successful are:

a. The British Home office counter terrorism operation known as CONTEST succeeded in preventing most viable attacks from taking place.

b. British and allied intelligence had penetrated some of the international terrorist networks.

c. But above all many of the British attacks were destined to fail through the technical incompetence of the attackers. Most of the fifteen apprehended plots were detected prior to readiness because their organisations had been penetrated, they had failed to learn to secure themselves against surveillance.

The British government's strongest reason why military operations in Helmand support security in UK is that each of the fifteen failed plots (probably with the exception of the Giraffe Café Bomber) could have been lethal if they had been more competent, technically, tactically and in respect of their mission security. And that the bombers operational competence would have been critically improved by access to a secure place to train and plan without fear of arrest . The allied campaign in southern Afghanistan prevents this safe place from existing . Allied operations block the fusion of three different adversaries in what would otherwise become an un-policed zone. The Afghan Taliban , the Pakistan Taliban and al Qaeda with its associated foreign fighters at present flourish or find refuge in different parts of the region. Reducing the military effort or a complete NATO withdrawal would mean that :

a. the three separated movements could establish safe havens within the same "liberated zone" of Afghanistan with damaging consequences for NATO nations.

b. The existence of a liberated zone will be trumpeted all over the world both by extremist movements and by the obliging Western media as a morale boosting victory for the jihad.

c. It would also become a centre and an icon for future Islamist extremist movements. d. And most significantly for the justification of an expeditionary force in Afghanistan, without a NATO presence - the black hole, the secure space, would reform.

The case against.

Even in this most strongly argued version, the British is position is illogical for these reasons:

a. The success record and the utility of international military interventions are at best questionable. After eight years the US operation in Southern Afghanistan has become part of a multinational , multidisciplinary, intervention. Although the US are still framework provider, they have lost control of the process. There is no longer a critical point or a critical mass. The intervention has transitioned into a typical 1990s contingency (think Cambodia or DRC), and they have an appalling record of success. Whether led by the most powerful nation in the world or by the UN, it is destined to slow failure.

b. But the main reason that the UK logic is flawed is that the insurgent activism and the attackers which threaten us are not from Afghanistan, they come from the UK itself ; the sources of violence lie within our own population.

c. The argument that the NATO presence in Afghanistan critically disarms the attackers' competence is to some extent torpedoed by the fact that British based terrorists already visit training schools - but they are not in Afghanistan. The majority of training bases are in Pakistan's frontier provinces and in FATA and the NATO intervention cannot secure these " liberated zones". Establishing a "liberated zone" in Afghanistan might result in better terrorists training schools than the ones in FATA , but is preventing this unquantifiable degree of improvement worth a British expeditionary force of 9000 troops in an open ended commitment?

d. Another reason for questioning the high prioritisation of the military campaign in Afghanistan is that after 9/11, many British Muslims became radicalised in the urban areas of UK without knowledge, assistance or oversight of foreign international networks. Vulnerable young Muslims are more likely to be subverted by a disaffected friend in the hub of the local mosque, campus and coffee shop, than by some highly structured terrorist organisation rooted in Afghanistan.

e. The key to shutting off the flow of attackers lies in altering the situation in UK, especially when the disaffected individual was still in a formative state. If UK plc focused more effort on the initial stages of disaffection the government could be manoeuvrist, exploit the individual's indecision, overwhelm the insurgent's manifesto, engage minds, undermine loyalties and successfully challenge newly acquired convictions.

Europe's Priorities versus America's Priorities.

The NATO campaign in Afghanistan had got seriously entangled in a Taliban uprising that was only marginally relevant to eradicating a globalised movement which threatened us . Unlike the US, Europe is connected geographically and through its migrant communities to the Muslim world; whereas the US can shrug off the consequences of its international unpopularity, the interconnected Europeans cannot. Huge spending on homeland security has made America almost impregnable , but Europe's open frontiers cannot be secured in the same way. Above all, the entire concept of the adversary in the US' Global War on Terror does not fit the European reality. Europe's Muslim communities were less well integrated, and more antagonised by the Global War on Terror. They are the centre of gravity in our campaign ; Europe is less threatened by a net flow of terrorists entering its territory from the overseas sanctuaries than by terrorist attacks arising from within their own population; attacks which are fomented by the presence of British troops on Muslim lands.

David BETZ

Source du texte : KINGS OF WAR